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Incentivizing Market and Control Design
Yasuaki Wasa, Kenji Hirata and Kenko Uchida
Abstract
We discuss an incentivizing market and model-based approach to design the energy management and control
systems which realize high-quality ancillary services in dynamic power grids. Under the electricity liberalization, such
incentivizing market should secure a high speed market-clearing by using the market players’ private information well.
Inspired by contract theory in microeconomics field, we propose a novel design method of such incentivizing market
based on the integration of the economics models and the dynamic grid model. The conventional contract problems are
analyzed for static systems or dynamical systems with control inputs directly operated by the principal. The analysis
is, however, in discord with the incentivizing market. The main challenge of our approach is to reformulate the
contract problems adapted to the market from the system and control perspective. We first establish the fundamental
formulas for optimal design, and clarify the basic properties of the designed market. We also discuss possibilities,
limitation and some challenges in the direction of our approach and general market-based approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Achieving a quality assurance of electric energy, called the ancillary service, is a key target of next-generation
energy management and control systems for dynamic electric smart grids where electricity liberalization is fully
enforced and renewable energy is highly penetrated [1]. Frequency, voltage and power controls, which are typical
contents of the ancillary service, have been technical requirements for the electric energy supplier (e.g., see [2],
[3]). Since the electricity liberalization starts, such ancillary control services have been investigated and realized in
competitive electricity markets [4], [5], [6]. In view these, future energy management and control systems should
include ancillary service markets with some incentive mechanisms, as core elements, which provide high-quality
and fast-response control services to the extent of the primary level. Moreover, if we need ancillary control services
of transient state, ancillary service markets should include physical models of dynamic power grids. In this article,
we propose an incentivizing market-based approach to design the energy management and control systems which
realize high-quality ancillary services in such dynamic power grids. Using this approach, we develop a design
method of such incentivizing market based on the integration of the economics models and the dynamic grid
model, and provide fundamental conditions and formulas for the incentivizing market design.
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2Our approach is developed under the assumption that an energy dispatch scheduling on a future time interval has
been finished in a spot energy market at the tertiary control level [7], [8], e.g., for one hour future interval, and that
each agent has a linearized model of his/her own system along the scheduled trajectory over the future time interval.
For this linear time-varying model, we formulate a design problem of energy management and control systems based
on a real-time regulation market, called the ancillary market, at the secondary and primary control levels [7], [8].
Participants in the dynamic electric smart grid are consumers, suppliers or prosumers, called agents, who control
their physical system selfishly according to their own criterion, and utility (independent public commission), who
integrates economically all the controls of agents into a high-quality power demand and supply. In the integration,
a market mechanism is adopted inevitably in order to secure selfish behaviors of agents in electricity liberalization;
that is, each agent bids his/her certain private information in response to a market-clearing price, while utility
(auctioneer) clears the market based on the bidding and decides the prices, in real-time.
The market model in our approach is characterized by two terminologies: private information and incentivizing
market. An iterative market-clearing model so-called the taˆtonnement model does not need rigorous models, but
does not generally guarantee the convergence to a specified equilibrium. Moreover, if it converges, the taˆtonnement
model takes a long time to converge at a market clearing equilibrium. To overcome the issues, we propose a
novel model-based and market-based approach that designs first some incentives for the agents to report their
private information (including their own model information) to the utility in the market, and makes it possible to
realize a high speed market-clearing. This approach needs incentivizing costs, and the resulting optimization process
can be recognized as an intermediate model (the second best model) between two extremal models, namely the
taˆtonnement model and the so-called supply/demand function equilibrium model (the first best model) which uses
for free all agents’ rigorous models, i.e., agents’ private information. We provide this approach with fundamental
formulas and tools to design the incentivizing mechanism in the market, and discuss the basic properties of the
designed market. We also discuss the relationships of our incentivizing mechanism with the Lagrange multiplier
based integration/decomposition mechanism and the mechanism design.
This article has been organized as follows: Section II introduces a dynamic power grid model and a model-
based incentivizing market model. We next derive some theoretical results on a general reward design problem in
Section III. In Section IV, we show the relationship between the private information and the incentives and discuss
possibilities and limitation of our approach through three typical scenarios. In Section V, we summarize the results.
II. GRID MODEL AND INCENTIVIZING MARKET MODEL
In this paper, we consider the two level architecture with the two layers market; spot energy market and real-
time regulation market. The well-known temporally-separated architecture [7], [8] motivated by the conventional
power system control is divided into the primary control level (voltage and frequency stabilization), the secondary
control level (quasi-stationary power imbalance control) and the tertiary control level (economic dispatch). The two
layers market reorganizes the conventional three-level architecture according to the functions of the markets. Our
approach is developed under the assumption that an energy dispatch scheduling on a future time interval has been
3finished in a spot energy market (at the tertiary control level), and that each agent has a linearized model of his/her
own system along the scheduled trajectory over the future time interval. For this linear time-varying model, we
formulate a design problem of energy management and control systems to realize ancillary services based on a
real-time regulation market (at the secondary and primary control levels).
A. Linearized Grid Model
Let us first consider the linearized time-varying model used in the ancillary market. This paper considers one of
the standard grid models, the average system frequency model [9], as a generic model of high speed response for
ancillary service control problems with two area power networks and with two kinds of players: Utility and Agents.
Here we present a linearized model of each player’s own system along the scheduled trajectory over a future time
interval during when an energy dispatch scheduling has been finished in a spot energy market.
The utility dynamics, which describes the deviation of the power and/or frequency balance and other deviations
from physical constraints as well, obeys the following equation:
dx0t = (A00(t)x0t +A01(t)x1t +A02(t)x2t) dt+D0(t)dβt, t0 ≤ t ≤ tf , (1)
and is evaluated by the utility’s revenue functional:
J0(t, x;u) = Et,x
[
ϕ0(tf , xtf ) +
∫ tf
t
l0(τ, xτ , uτ )dτ
]
(2)
where x = (x⊤0 , x
⊤
1 , x
⊤
2 )
⊤ ∈ Rn is the collection of the states of the utility dynamics x0 ∈ R
n0 and the agents’
dynamics xi ∈ R
ni , i = 1, 2, at time t ∈ [t0, tf ], and u = (u
⊤
1 , u
⊤
2 )
⊤ is the local control inputs, respectively; βt is
the disturbance modeled by a standard Wiener process on [t0, tf ]; Et,x indicates an expectation given initial data
(t, x); we use an abbreviation like x0t = x0(t), xt = x(t). The dynamics of the agent i (i = 1, 2) obeys
dxit = (Ai(t)xit +Bi(t)uit)dt+Di(t)dβt, t0 ≤ t ≤ tf , i = 1, 2, (3)
and is evaluated by the agent’s revenue functional:
Ji(t, x;u) = Et,x
[
ϕi(tf , xtf ) +
∫ tf
t
li(τ, xτ , uτ )dτ
]
, i = 1, 2. (4)
The agent’s state xi indicates typically the deviation of power generation or consumption from the scheduled
trajectory; the control ui compensates the deviation. An admissible control of agent i, denoted as ui ∈ Γi, is a
state feedback uit = ui(t, x) denoted by ui : [t0, tf ]× R
n → Ui ⊂ R
mi is continuous at t ∈ [t0, tf ] and Lipschitz
continuous at x ∈ Rn, i = 1, 2. To simplify the description in the following, let us describe the grid dynamics by
combining the utility dunamics (1) and the agent’s dynamics (3) as follows:
dxt = f(t, xt, ut)dt+D(t)dβt := (f0(t, xt) + f1(t, x1t, u1t) + f2(t, x2t, u2t)) dt+D(t)dβt (5)
where
f0 =


A00x0 +A01x1 +A02x2
0
0

 , f1 =


0
A1x1 +B1u1
0

 , f2 =


0
0
A2x2 +B2u2

 , D =


D0
D1
D2

 .
4We need the following assumptions, which make the discussions in this paper mathematically regorous. The
notations ∇t = ∂/∂t, ∇x = (∂/∂x0, ∂/∂x1, ∂/∂x2) and ∇
2
x = [∂
2/∂xi∂xj ] are used.
(A1) Each element of matrices A00(t), A0i(t), Ai(t), Bi(t),D0(t),Di(t), i = 1, 2, are continuous at t ∈ [t0, tf ],
and D(t)D(t)⊤ > 0 for all t ∈ [t0, tf ].
(A2) The set Ui, i = 1, 2, are compact and convex.
(A3) The function ϕ0(tf , ·) : R
n → R is of class C2 and ∇xϕ0(tf , ·) is polynomial growth. The function
l0 : [t0, tf ]× R
n × U1 × U2 → R is C
1 at (t, u1, u2) ∈ [t0, tf ]× U1 × U2 and C
2 at x ∈ Rn, and ∇xl0,
∇ui l0, i = 1, 2, are polynomial growth at (x, u1, u2) ∈ R
n × U1 × U2.
(A4) The function ϕi(tf , ·) : R
ni → R is of class C2 and ∇xϕi(tf , ·) is polynomial growth. The function
li : [t0, tf ] × R
ni × Ui → R is C
1 at t ∈ [t0, tf ] and C
2 at (xi, ui) ∈ R
ni × Ui, and ∇xi li, ∇ui li are
polynomial growth at (xi, ui) ∈ R
ni × Ui and ∇
2
ui
li < 0, i = 1, 2.
We formulated the grid model with the evaluation functionals on the finite time interval [t0, tf ]. For simplicity,
from now on, we consider the state feedback strategies u = (u⊤1 , u
⊤
2 )
⊤ derived by dynamic programming. We will
discuss possibilities of the other options in Section IV. To achieve the objective, we reformulate our problems on
the future time interval from the current time t to the final time tf based on the time-consistency property.
To describe formulas concisely, we adopt the continuous-time model in this article; we can develop in parallel the
same results in the discrete-time model. On the other hand, to develop our discussion in the continuous-time model
in a mathematically sound way, we need some technical assumptions as stated above and in the later discussion;
however, the assumptions except that on convexity (or concavity) are for assuring an appropriate smoothness and
boundness of the variables appearing in the discussions, but not essential for developing our key ideas.
B. Incentivizing Market Model
To describe market mechanism, we need to specify participant’s private information. Private information of
agent i = 1, 2 consists of model information Ξi = (fi, ϕi, li) and on-line information Zit ⊂ {x
tf
it , u
tf
it }, where
x
tf
it := {xiτ , t ≤ τ ≤ tf} and u
tf
it := {uiτ , t ≤ τ ≤ tf}.
To incentivize agent’s behavior in market model, we (or a market planner) use a reward (salary) functional of
the following form. The reward (salary) functional:
Wwi (t, x
tf
t ;u) = wif (tf , xtf ) + wi0(t, x) +
∫ tf
t
wi1(τ, xτ )dτ +
∫ tf
t
wi2(τ, xτ )dxτ , t0 ≤ t ≤ tf , i = 1, 2, (6)
are defined along with the grid dynamics dxτ = f(τ, xτ , uτ )dτ + D(τ)dβτ where w = (w1, w2) and wi =
(wif , wi0, wi1, wi2). Admissible parameters of the reward functional, denoted as w = (w1, w2) ∈ Π × Π, are
defiend by: wif (tf , ·) : R
n → R is of class C2 and ∇xwif (tf , ·) is polynomial growth; wi0 : [t0, tf ]× R
n → R is
continuous at (t, x) ∈ [t0, tf ] × R
n; wi1 : [t0, tf ] × R
n → R are C1 at t ∈ [t0, tf ] and C
2 at x ∈ Rn, and ∇xwi1
is polynomial growth at x ∈ Rn; wi2 : [t0, tf ] × R
n → R1×n is of class C1 and polynomial growth at x ∈ Rn,
and ∇xwi2 is bounded. We use the notation W
w
i so as to emphasize the dependence of Wi on the choice of the
parameter w. In the following discussion, we often use the same notation to show such parameter dependence. We
5try to express the parameter w with another parameter h, which we call the price, so that the reward functional
depends on the choice of the price h; then such dependence is also denoted as Whi .
The reward functionals together with the utility’s revenue functional and the agent’s revenue functional define
the social welfare functional as:
Iw(t, x;u) = J0(t, x;u)− Et,x
[
Ww1 (t, x
tf
t ;u)
]
− Et,x
[
Ww2 (t, x
tf
t ;u)
]
(7)
and the agent’s profit functional as:
Iwi (t, x;u) = Ji(t, x;u) + Et,x
[
Wwi (t, x
tf
t ;u)
]
, i = 1, 2. (8)
A market planner designs a market mechanism with incentivizing structures and makes auction rules as well,
based on the evaluation functionals and the grid model information introduced so far; the auction is performed in
the following five steps:
Step 1: Utility announces the auction system, and agents decide participation.
Step 2: Agent offers his/her bid based on his/her own private information.
Step 3: Based on agents’ bids, price is determined so as to maximize social welfare.
Step 4: Agent decides his/her control to maximize his/her own profit based on price.
Step 5: Utility pay rewards to agents.
Note that Steps 2, 3 and 4 will be performed continuously over a finite time interval.
III. MODEL-BASED ONE-SHOT MARKET MECHANISM
A. Reward Design for Incentivizing
Components of our market model and their general interplay have been described in the previous section. To
complete our market model, we need to fix a concrete shape of agents’ bidding, and design reward functionals by
choosing their characterizing parameter, called the reward parameter, w = (w1, w2). First, let us specify agents’
private information to be bidden in the market model discussed here: Each agent’s model information Ξi = (fi, ϕi, li)
is sent a priori to utility, and each agent’s on-line information to be bidden is just the current state, i.e., Zit = xit,
which means that utility cannot access control input ui. Then, the design problem of our market is reduced to a
social welfare maximization problem, called the reward design problem, subject to the constraints that provide the
market with two incentivizing functions by rewards, which is formulated as follows:
max
u∈Γ1×Γ2, w∈Π×Π
Iw(t, x;u)
subject to
(Constraint 1) Iw1 (t, x;u) = max
v1∈Γ1
Iw1 (t, x; v1, u2), I
w
2 (t, x;u) = max
v2∈Γ2
Iw2 (t, x;u1, v2),
(Constraint 2) Iw1 (t, x;u) ≥ k1(t, x), I
w
2 (t, x;u) ≥ k2(t, x),
where ki : [t0, tf ] × R
n → R is continuous at (t, x) ∈ [t0, tf ] × R
n. By solving this problem, we obtain the
optimal reward functional with two incentive functions and the agents’ optimal controls. Constraint 1 claims that
6the reward incentivizes each agent’s behavior to adopt the optimal control that maximizes her own profit and, in
other words, constitutes a Nash equilibrium together with the other agent’s control. This also implies that, since the
utility holds the bidden models, the utility can know the control profile, even if it is not bidden. On the other hand,
Constraint 2 assures a prescribed level of each agent’s profit. The above formulation is an application of the moral
hazard problem in contract theory [10], [11] to our market design problem; using terminology of contract theory,
we call Constraint 1 and Constraint 2 the incentive compatibility constraint and the individual rationality constraint,
respectively. The conventional contract (moral hazard) problems analyzed for static systems and dynamical systems
with control inputs directly operated by the principal [10]. The analysis is, however, in discord with the incentivizing
market. The main challenge of our incentivizing market design is to reformulate the moral problems adapted to the
market as above and synthesize the proposed market from the system and control perspective.
B. Solutions for General Reward Design
To solve the reward design problem, we start specifying a form of the reward functionals by using Constraints
1 and 2. For a parameter w = (w1, w2) ∈ Π × Π, let (u
w
1 , u
w
2 ) be a pair of optimal controls (a Nash equilibrium
in Γ1 × Γ2) defined by u
w
i = argmaxui∈Γi I
w
i (t, x;ui, u
w
−i), i = 1, 2, so that Constraint 1 is fulfilled, where
u−1 := u2 and u−2 := u1. Then, as shown in Appendix, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations for the
value functions
V wi (t, x) = max
ui∈Γi
Iwi (t, x;ui, u
w
−i)− wi0(t, x), i = 1, 2, (9)
lead the reward functional to the form:
Wwi (t, x
tf
t ;ui, u
w
−i) = h
w
i0(t, x) − ϕi(tf , xitf )
−
∫ tf
t
[hwi1(τ, xt)f(τ, xτ , u
w
1 (τ, xτ ), u
w
2 (τ, xτ )) + li(τ, xit, u
w
i (τ, xτ ))] dτ +
∫ tf
t
hwi1(τ, xτ )dxτ (10)
along with dxτ = f(τ, xτ , ui(τ, xτ ), u
w
−i(τ, xτ ))dτ +D(τ)dβτ , t ≤ τ ≤ tf , where h
w
i0 and h
w
i1 are defined by
hwi0(t, x) = V
w
i (t, x) + wi0(t, x) (11a)
hwi1(t, x) = ∇xV
w
i (t, x) + wi2(t, x) (11b)
Moreover, uwi , i = 1, 2, which constitute a Nash equilibirum, must satisfy
uwi (τ, x) = arg max
ui∈Ui
[
hwi1(τ, x)f(τ, x, ui, u
w
−i(τ, x)) + li(τ, xi, ui) + wi1(τ, x)
]
= arg max
ui∈Ui
[hwi1(τ, x)fi(τ, xi, ui) + li(τ, xi, ui)]
so that a function µi given in Lemma 1 provides uniquely u
w
i with the expression of an explicit dependence on h
w
i1
such that uwi (τ, x) = µi(τ, xi, h
w
i1(τ, x)). For simplicity of notation, we will denote sometimes µi(τ, xi, h
w
i1(τ, x))
by µ
hwi1
i (τ, x).
Lemma 1: There exists a unique function µi that satisfies
µi(τ, xi, pi) = arg max
ui∈Ui
[pifi(τ, xi, ui) + li(τ, xi, ui)] , i = 1, 2, (12)
7for each (τ, xi, pi) ∈ [t0, tf ] × R
ni × R1×n such that µi is continuous at (τ, xi, pi) and Lipschitz continuous at
(xi, pi).
Proof: The continuity at (τ, xi, pi) follows from the uniqueness of the maximum. The Lipschitz continuity is
shown by Lemma VI.6.3 in [12].
Now, summarizing the above observation, we see that, in solving the reward design problem, Costraint 1 enables
us to limit a search of the optimal reward functional to the class of the form (10). In this form of the reward
functional, hwi0 and h
w
i1 are given by (11a) and (11b), respectively, which implies that they depend on a choice of
the parameter w ∈ (w1, w2) ∈ Π×Π. We can show that this class of reward functionals is invariant, even if the class
of parameters hwi = (h
w
i0, h
w
i1) is generalized to a class where dependence on the parameter w is not necessarily
required. For this purpose, let hi = (hi0, hi1) and define a class of reward parameters h = (h1, h2) ∈ H × H
such that hi0 : [t0, tf ] × R
n → R is continuous at (t, x) ∈ [t0, tf ] × R
n; hi1 : [t0, tf ] × R
n → R1×n is of
class C1 and polynomial growth at x ∈ Rn, and ∇xhi1 is bounded. Note that h
w = (hw1 , h
w
2 ) ∈ H ×H for any
w = (w1, w2) ∈ Π×Π if (V
w
i ,∇xV
w
i ) is in the class H .
Proposition 1: (a) A pair of controls (uw1 , u
w
2 ) constitutes a Nash equilibrium satisfying Constraint 1 for a pair
of reward functionals (Ww1 ,W
w
2 ) with a parameter w = (w1, w2) ∈ Π × Π and the corresponding pair of value
functions (V w1 , V
w
2 ) satisfies the condition that (V
w
i ,∇xV
w
i ), i = 1, 2 are in the class H , only if there is a parameter
h = (h1, h2) ∈ H ×H such that the pair of reward functionals has the form
Whi (t, x
tf
t ;ui, µ
h−i1
−i ) = h
w
i0(t, x) − ϕi(tf , xitf )
−
∫ tf
t
[
hi1(τ, xt)f(τ, xτ , µ
h11
1 (τ, xτ ), µ
h21
2 (τ, xτ )) + li(τ, xit, µ
hi1
i (τ, xτ ))
]
dτ +
∫ tf
t
hi1(τ, xτ )dxτ (13)
along with dxτ = f(τ, xτ , ui(τ, xτ ), µ
h−i1
−i (τ, xτ ))dτ +D(τ)dβτ , i = 1, 2.
(b) For the reward functionals (13) with a parameter h = (h1, h2) ∈ H ×H , a pair of controls (u1, u2) ∈ Γ1× Γ2
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it has the form
ui(τ, x) = µi(τ, xi, hi1(τ, x)), i = 1, 2. (14)
(c) For the reward functionals (13) with a parameter h = (h1, h2) ∈ H × H and the Nash equilibrium (14),
Constraint 2 is fulfilled if and only if hi0, i = 1, 2, are specified such as hi0(t, x) ≥ ki(t, x).
Proof: (a) We have already seen that, for a chosen parameter w = (w1, w2) ∈ Π×Π, the reward functionals
for which (uw1 , u
w
2 ) constitutes a Nash equilibrium must have the form (10) with the parameters (11a) and (11b),
and the Nash equilibrium must be given as uwi (τ, x) = µi(τ, xi, h
w
i1(τ, x)), i = 1, 2. Now, let h = (h1, h2) ∈ H×H
be chosen independently of w and set a reward parameter w¯ = (w¯1, w¯2) ∈ Π×Π as
w¯if (tf , x) = −ϕi(tf , x)
w¯i0(t, x) = hi0(t, x)
w¯i1(t, x) = −hi1(τ, x)f(τ, x, µ
h11
1 (τ, x), µ
h21
2 (τ, x)) − li(τ, xi, µ
hi1
i (τ, x))
w¯i2 = hi1(τ, x).
8Then, we can show that, for these reward parameters, the HJB equation (20) in Appendix has a unique constant
solution of the form V w¯i (τ, x) = 0, so that we have h
w¯
i0(t, x) = V
w¯
i (t, x) + w¯i0(t, x) = hi0(t, x) and h
w¯
i1(τ, x) =
∇xV
w¯
i (τ, x)+ w¯i2(τ, x) = hi1(τ, x). This implies that the class of reward functionals given by (10) with (11a) and
(11b) is invariant, even if the class of parameters hw = (hw1 , h
w
2 ) depending on w is generalized to H ×H , and
proves the part (a) of this proposition.
(b) For reward functionals of the form (13) with a parameter h = (h1, h2) ∈ H×H , profit functionals of the agent
i = 1, 2 are represented as
Ihi (t, x
tf
t ;ui, µ
h−i1
−i ) = hi0(t, x)−
∫ tf
t
[
hi1(τ, xτ )f(τ, xτ , µ
h11
1 (τ, xτ ), µ
h21
2 (τ, xτ )) + li(τ, xiτ , µ
hi1
i (τ, xτ ))
]
dτ
+
∫ tf
t
[
hi1(τ, xτ )f(τ, xτ , ui(τ, xτ ), µ
h−i1
−i (τ, xτ )) + li(τ, xiτ , ui(τ, xτ ))
]
dτ. (16)
From the definition of µi given in Lemma 1, the second (integral) term in the right hand side of the identity above
is non-negative, and therefore the pair of controls (u1, u2) ∈ Γ1×Γ2 is a Nash equilibrium if and only if ui = µ
hi1
i ,
i = 1, 2.
(c) It is obvious because the identity (16) guarantees Ihi (t, x
tf
t ;µ
h11
1 , µ
h21
2 ) = hi0(t, x), i = 1, 2.
A key message of part (a) in Proposition 1 is that the original parameter w = (w1, w2) can be replaced with
the parameter h = (h1, h2). We will see below that the parameter h can be interpreted as a price (vector), and
show that it enables us to introduce a dynamic contract, which realizes requisite incentives, in the market model.
Another message from the parts (a) and (b) is that we can shift the Nash equilibrium (14) freely to some extent
by selecting the price (vector) h. The parameterization of reward (salary) functional with the parameter h would
be in itself a new result of interest in contract theory, which is different from the known types based on typically
the so-called first order condition [11], [13], [14] and the other types [15], [16] in the contract theory literatures.
Finally, note that for proving this proposition we do not use the linearity of the grid model in the state, while we
need the linearity and additivity in the controls in the grid model and the convexity (concavity) of the control ranges
and the revenue functions in (A2) and (A4) as well.
Now, using Proposition 1, we can present an optimal control based approach, in which the parameter h =
(h1, h2) ∈ H ×H plays a role of control, to the reward design problem.
Theorem 1: The reward design problem with the parameter h = (h1, h2) ∈ H ×H is equivalent to an optimal
control problem described by
max
(h1,h2)∈H×H
Ih(t, x;µh111 , µ
h21
2 )
subject to
hi0(t, x) ≥ ki(t, x), i = 1, 2,
and the stochastic state equation:
dxτ = f(τ, xτ , µ
h11
1 (τ, xτ ), µ
h21
2 (τ, xτ ))dτ +D(τ)dβτ , t ≤ τ ≤ tf ,
where µhi1i (τ, x) = µi(τ, xi, hi1(τ, x)), i = 1, 2.
9Proof: From (a) of Proposition 1 that the social welfare functional Ih(t, x;µh111 , µ
h21
2 ) is represented by
Ih(t, x;µh111 , µ
h21
2 ) = J0(t, x;µ
h11
1 , µ
h21
2 )− Et,x
[
2∑
i=1
Whi (t, x
tf
t ;µ
h11
1 , µ
h21
2 )
]
= Et,x
[
ϕ0(tf , xtf ) +
∫ tf
t
l0(τ, xτ , µ
h11
1 (τ, xτ ), µ
h21
2 (τ, xτ ))dτ
]
+Et,x
[
2∑
i=1
(
ϕi(tf , xitf ) +
∫ tf
t
li(τ, xiτ , µ
hi1
i (τ, xτ ))dτ
)]
−
2∑
i=1
hi0(t, x). (17)
Then, from (b) and (c) of Proposition 1, Constraints 1 and 2 are fulfilled, respectively, for any h = (h1, h2) ∈ H×H .
Thus we have this theorem.
The optimal solution h∗ = (h∗1, h
∗
2) ∈ H × H leads to the Nash equilibrium (µ
h∗
11
1 , µ
h∗
21
2 ), i = 1, 2. Note that
h∗i0(t, x) = ki(t, x), i = 1, 2 follows from the expression (17), and then Constraint 2 is fulfilled.
IV. DISCUSSION THROUGH TYPICAL SCENARIOS
It is generally difficult to solve the optimal control problem in Theorem 1. Here, focusing on some special cases,
we discuss qualitative properties of the parameter h and try to give economic meanings to the parameter and the
reward functional.
Let the value function be denoted by
V (t, x) = sup
(h1,h2)∈H××H
Ih(t, x;µh111 , µ
h21
2 ) + h10(t, x) + h20(t, x). (18)
Then, the HJB equation is given by
∇tV (t, x) +
1
2
[
∇2xV (t, x)D(t)D(t)
⊤
]
+ sup
(h11,h21)∈R1×n×R1×n
[
∇xV (t, x)f0(t, x) + l0(t, xi, µ1(t, x1, h11), µ2(t, x2, h21))
+
2∑
i=1
(∇xV (t, x)fi(t, xi, µi(t, xi, hi1)) + li(t, xi, µi(t, xi, hi1)))
]
= 0. (19a)
V (tf , xtf ) = ϕ0(tf , xtf ) + ϕ1(tf , x1tf ) + ϕ2(tf , x2tf ). (19b)
In this section, we discuss the relationship between the private information and the incentives, interpretation and
limitation of our approach through three typical cases.
(A) Consider the case when the utility evaluates only the grid state x and does not evaluate the agents’ control
inputs ui, i = 1, 2 such that l0 = l0(τ, x).
Corollary 1: In Case (A), if the HJB equation (19) has a solution V (t, x) such that (V,∇xV ) is in the class H ,
the optimal parameters h∗i = (h
∗
i0, h
∗
i1) ∈ H , i = 1, 2 are given by h
∗
i0(t, x) = ki(t, x) and h
∗
i1(t, x) = ∇xV (t, x),
t0 ≤ t ≤ tf .
Proof: h∗i0(t, x) = ki(t, x) is already noted. In Case (A), the maximization in the HJB equation (19) becomes
2∑
i=1
sup
hi1∈R1×n
[∇xV (t, x)fi(t, xi, µi(t, xi, hi1)) + li(t, x, µi(t, xi, hi1))] ,
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and it follows from Lemma 1 that the maximum is attained by h∗i1(t, x) = ∇xV (t, x), i = 1, 2. Then, the verification
theorem [11, Theorem VI.4.1] verifies the optimality of the parameter.
The fact h∗i1(t, x) = ∇xV (t, x), i = 1, 2, shown in Corollary 1 implies that the reward parameter h
∗
11(t, x)(=
h∗21(t, x)) can be regarded as a price of quantity x at time t; ∇xV (t, x) is actually called the shadow price in
economics literatures, and our parametrization of the reward functional could be suitable for the market model.
Note that the form of the utility’s revenue function as l0 = l0(τ, x) is no so restrictive, since the utility dynamics
has no control input.
(B) Consider the case that the utility’s revenue functional is given by
J0(t, x;u) = Et,x
[
ϕ0(tf , xtf ) +
∫ tf
t
l0(τ, xτ )dτ +
2∑
i=1
(
ϕi(tf , xitf ) +
∫ tf
t
li(τ, xiτ , uiτ )dτ
)]
.
That is, the utility’s revenue is the sum of the original utility’s revenue and the agent’s revenues. Assume further that
the payment of the rewards for the agents is not liquidated in the social welfare, i.e., the utility’s revenue functional
above is identical to the social welfare functional, and the agents ask no profit, i.e., ki(t, x) ≡ 0, i = 1, 2. In this
case, as the problem is basically equivalent to that in Case (A) with ki(t, x) ≡ 0, i = 1, 2, repeating the same
argument as in Case (A), we can obtain the same result as Corollary 1 with h∗i0(t, x) ≡ 0, i = 1, 2. The result shows
that, if the price vector ∇xV (t, x), called the adjoint vector in the optimal control theory, is provided by the utility,
each agent can realize his/her optimal control in a decentralized way such as µhi1i (τ, x) = µi(τ, xi,∇xV (τ, x)),
i = 1, 2; this result corresponds to the dual decomposition of the static optimization based on “Lagrange multiplier”
(price). On the other hand, from the viewpoint of the incentive design, each agent in Case (B) has a zero level
of incentive to the participation in the market (the decentralized optimization based on the price), because he/she
obtains no profit, whereas, in Case (A), agents have the profits ki(t, x), i = 1, 2, rewarded by the utility and have
the incentives to the participation. We see that the implementation of this decentralized optimization scheme may
require additional incentives or legal forces for strategic agents.
(C) The reward design discussed so far incentivizes agents to constitute a Nash equilibrium (Constraint 1) and
to participate in the market if the profit level is over his/her expectation (Constraint 2). However, these are assured
under the tacit assumption that the agents’ private information consisting of the model data and the on-line data is
truthfully sent and bidden; if an agent fictitiously bids his/her private information, for example, the Nash equilibrium
shifts or disappears; the mechanism design [17], [18] provides a solution in such case by using additional incentives.
Consider the same setting as in Case (B) where the social welfare functional given as above and does not include
the budget for payment of the agents’ rewards, and, on the other hand, let the agent’s profit functional have an
additional reward functional as
Iwi (t, x;u) = Ji(t, x;u) + Et,x
[
Wwi (t, x
tf
t ;u)
]
+ Et,x
[
Wwai(t, x
tf
t ;u)
]
where
Et,x
[
Wwa1(t, x
tf
t ;u)
]
= J0(t, x;u) + J2(t, x;u), Et,x
[
Wwa2(t, x
tf
t ;u)
]
= J0(t, x;u) + J1(t, x;u)
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and l0 = l0(τ, x). In this case, replacing ϕi(tf , xitf ) with ϕ0(tf , xtf ) +
∑2
i=1 ϕi(tf , xitf ) and also li(τ, xi, ui)
with l0(τ, x) +
∑2
i=1 li(τ, xi, ui) and repeating the same argument as in Case (A), we have the same conclusion
as in Corollary 1, so that the agents should constitute a Nash equilibrium and participate in the market. In this
case, moreover, the agents should report his/her model information and bid his/her on-line information truthfully;
the reason for this is as follows. First, note that the additional reward W ai provides the utility and all the agents
with the same revenue, so that the optimal price from the viewpoint of the social welfare is optimal for all the
agents. Second, note that the utility calculates the optimal price based on the reported model and the bidden states.
Therefore, if an agent sends or bids fictitiously his/her private information to the market, the agent obtains a price
which is not optimal for his/her own profit. This incentivizing scheme corresponds to the Groves mechanism [17] in
mechanism design literatures. Finally, we point out an issue of this scheme; the rewards W ai should be additionally
paid from the social welfare budget.
V. CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of a genetic model suggested from the average system frequency model [9], we have discussed
the incentivizing market and model-based approach to design the energy management and control systems which
realize ancillary services in dynamic power grids. The key issue of the approach is to incentivize the agents (areas)
to open their private information, which is essential to realize our model-based scheme, to the utility. We have
proposed a design method of such incentivizing market by integrating the economics models and tools with the
dynamic physical model, and clarified its basic properties of use together with its possibilities and limits for further
developments.
APPENDIX
Based on the principle of optimality, the value function (9) leads to the HJB equation:
∇tV
w
i (t, x) +
1
2
tr
[
∇2xV
w
i (t, x)D(t)D(t)
⊤
]
= − max
ui∈Ui
[
(∇xV
w
i (t, x) + wi2(t, x)) f(t, x, ui, u
w
−i(t, x)) + li(t, xi, ui) + wi1(t, x)
]
= −
[
(∇xV
w
i (t, x) + wi2(t, x)) f(t, x, u
w
i (t, x), u
w
−i(t, x)) + li(t, xi, u
w
i (t, x)) + wi1(t, x)
]
,(20a)
V wi (tf , xtf ) = ϕi(tf , xitf ) + wif (tf , xtf ). (20b)
Substituting the above relation into the right hand side of the Ito’s differential equality
dV wi (t, xt) =
(
∇tV
w
i (t, xt) +
1
2
tr
[
∇2xV
w
i (t, xt)D(t)D(t)
⊤
])
dt+∇xV
w
i (t, xt)dxt
along with dxt = f(t, xt, ui(t, xt), u
w
−i(t, xt))dt + D(t)dβt, and integrating the both side on [t, tf ], we have the
reward functional of the form (10) with (11a) and (11b).
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